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Abstract 
 
We examine various factors that influence the effects of government-subsidized 
research and development (R&D) programs on firm productivity. Based on a panel 
dataset of Chinese firms, we find the effects of the Innovation Fund for Small and 
Medium Technology Based Firm (Innofund) are dynamic over time and are heterogeneous 
depending on funding forms and the level of marketization and economic development 
across regions. In general, Innfound has significant and positive effects on firm 
productivity in both short and long run. However, the short-term effects of Innofund are 
stronger than the long-term ones. Additionally, the positive effects of Innofund are 
stronger for firms backed by interest-free bank loans than those supported by 
appropriation. Meanwhile, Innofund has stronger positive effects in provinces that are 
less market-oriented or less developed economically. Finally, the short-term effects of 
Innofund are stay stronger than the long-term ones even after we control the funding 
forms and the market conditions across-regions. Identification and selection concerns 
are addressed through the propensity score matching approach and two-stage estimation.  
 
Key words: government R&D program, firm productivity, dynamics, marketization, 
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I. Introduction  
Government funding for corporate research and development (R&D) activities is 
introduced as a solution for the market failure of underinvestment in R&D by profit- 
driven enterprises (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Hall and Lerner, 2010). However, 
empirical evidence regarding the effects of government-subsidized R&D remains 
inconclusive. Some studies find that government-subsidized firms achieve higher 
productivity and profitability compared to firms not supported by government subsidies 
(Griliches and Regev, 1998; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 1998). Moreover, such firms 
grow faster (Lerner, 2000), more successfully access other external finances (Lerner, 
2000; Aschhoff, 2010), invest more in R&D activities (Audretsch et al., 2002; Lach, 
2002; Görg and Strobl, 2007; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 
2013), and generate higher social returns than their counterparts do (Griliches and Regev, 
1998; Irwin and Klenow, 1996). Nevertheless, a considerable number of studies indicate 
that public R&D programs do not stimulate firm performance (Klette and Møen, 1998) or 
exert limited positive effects on corporate R&D spending except for small firms (Lööf 
and Hesmati, 2005) or research-oriented projects (Clausen, 2009). Moreover, several 
studies determine that government R&D subsidies actually crowd out private R&D inputs, 
consequently reducing social welfare and growth (Wallsten, 2000; Busom, 2000; 
Acemoglu et al., 2013).  
The mixed findings indicate that the effects of government R&D programs may not be 
straightforward; rather, such effects may differ across markets, depend on the funding 
forms, and be dynamic after the infusion of subsidies (Klette et al., 2000; David et al., 2000). 
Nonetheless, most existing works regard government R&D programs as a whole to either 
examine the general effects of such programs or to capture one of the aforementioned 
factors. To our knowledge, no research has been conducted to examine how the different 
factors influence the effects of government subsidy programs simultaneously.  
Our present study attempts to fill this knowledge gap by examining the different factors 
that may influence the effects of Innovation Fund for Small and Medium Technology-
based Firms (Innofund). Innofund is one of the largest programs developed by the 
Chinese government that aim to support the corporate R&D activities of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). First, we examine the general effects of Innofund on 
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firm productivity. Second, we compare the short-term and long-term effects of such 
program to determine whether or not Innofund effects are dynamic over time after the 
infusion of subsidies. Third, we examine whether the different funding forms of 
government subsidies exert varying effects on firm productivity. Forth, we investigate 
whether the effects of the government initiatives vary under different market conditions. 
This current research is relevant for the following reasons: first, the Chinese 
government has been deeply involved in business and resource allocation (Li et al., 2008; 
Guo et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2015). Existing studies mainly emphasize the effects of 
government R&D initiatives on economies with free markets to determine how 
government subsidies adjust market failures. Nonetheless, how such government R&D 
programs work in an economy in which the government is deeply engaged in business 
activities, such as in the case of China, is lack of scrutiny. Second, the institutional 
background in China and the operation of Innofund provide a good opportunity to 
examine the effects of such program from different aspects. Innofund is a nationwide 
R&D program in China that has been operating for 16 years and offers different forms of 
funding across various regions. This program therefore facilitates investigation into how 
different funding forms affect firms across various regions in both long-term and short-
term aspects. The present investigation into the varying factors influencing the effects of 
government funding through the same program within the same country over time may 
help us rule out the potential identification concerns in cross-country or cross-program 
studies. Hence, this study assists in identifying the circumstances under which 
government funding significantly affects firms. Third, innovation and progress in science 
and technology comprise the top agenda of the Chinese government. Public support for 
industrial innovation in China attracts global interest because such an initiative 
profoundly influences the sustainability of China’s growth and the competitive landscape 
of the global economy; nonetheless, systematic examinations of the consequences of 
government R&D programs in China remain limited.  
Based on a panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms between 1998 and 2007, 
we find that firms backed by Innofund exhibit significantly magnified increases in 
productivity following the infusion of funds. Moreover, we observe a stronger effect of 
Innofund in short run than that in long run. Additionally, the effects of Innofund vary 
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according to the forms of support. Firms that are supported by interest-free bank loans 
enjoy significantly higher increases in productivity than those supported by appropriation. 
Finally, the effects of Innofund vary across regions; these influences are stronger in 
regions less market-oriented or less developed economically than in other regions. 
We use two approaches to address the identification issues, i.e. the potential 
selection biases and effects of unobservable factors. We first use propensity score 
matching (PSM) to match Innofund-backed with non-Innofund-backed firms in relevant 
dimensions to build up a control group. Such procedure is a quasi-experiment approach 
employed to reduce selection issues effectively.  We then perform two-stage estimations 
with two instrumental variables (IVs) to deal with concerns with omitted variables and 
identify the ex-post effects of Innofund. The first IV is the total number of firms in the 
high-tech zones of the city in which the firm is located in each given year. The second IV 
is the ratio of total investment in fixed assets made by local governments over total GDP 
in the county in which the firm is located in each given year. The two-stage estimations 
confirm the causality of the significantly increased productivity of Innofund-backed firms 
and the government subsidies. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
institutional background of the Innofund program. Section 3 discusses how the 
hypotheses are developed. Section 4 describes the sample and the data. Section 5 presents 
the findings on the general and dynamic effects of Innofund and addresses the potential 
identification concerns. Section 6 discusses the effects of this program with different 
forms of support and under various market conditions. Section 7 concludes this study.  
II. Introduction on the Innofund program 
Innofund is a government R&D program that was established with the approval of 
the State Council in May 1999 with the aim to   “facilitate and encourage the innovation 
activities of small and medium technology-based enterprises (SMTEs)” 1. It is currently 
the largest government program supporting corporate R&D activities of SMTEs in China.    
The principal criteria for Innofund application are focused on three aspects. First, the 
project should comply with national industrial technology policies and have high 
potential economic and social benefits. Second, the annual R&D investment of the firm 
                                                     
1Source: http://www.innofund.gov.cn/ 
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should be at least more than 3% of its total sales, and the number of direct R&D 
employees should be more than 10% of the total number of employees. Third, a qualified 
applicant should be a SMTE with no more than 500 employees.   
Innofund mainly provides three forms of financing, namely, appropriation, interest-
free bank loans, and equity investment. Appropriation is the major start-up capital 
provided to small firms that have been founded by research personnel with their own 
scientific achievements.  Interest-free bank loans are mainly provided to SMTEs which 
plan to expand the production scale of innovation projects. Equity investment is generally 
reserved for projects with high levels of technology, high innovation capacity, and market 
potential in the emerging industries. The total amount of subsidy for an individual project 
generally ranges between 1 and 2 million RMB. Innofund has provided more than 19.17 
billion RMB of funding to 30,537 projects in the period of 1999 to 2011. Among the 
30,537 projects backed by Innofund between 1999 and 2011, 27,498 (more than 86% of 
the total) are backed by appropriation, 2,880 by interest-free bank loans, and 1,159 by 
other funding forms, including bank loan warranty and equity investment. 
By average, Innofund granting duration is three years. Innofund Administration 
Committee (IAC) is in charge of monitoring and evaluating the performance of the 
awarded projects after the infusion of the subsidies. Upon the completion of the contracts, 
IAC would organize a panel of experts to evaluate whether the projects have achieved the 
desired targets. If a firm fails the final evaluation, it will not be qualified to apply for 
Innofund (or even other government R&D programs) for a period of time.  
III Funding forms, market conditions and dynamic Innofund effects  
3.1 Dynamic effects of government R&D subsidies  
The effects of public R&D programs on firm productivity may vary in the short and 
long runs. First, the dynamic effects of government subsidies for corporate R&D may 
depend on the tradeoffs between the adjustment costs of R&D investment and the 
liquidity constraints faced by firms. Investing in R&D activities is a complicated 
decision-making and implementation process that involves handling new resources or 
reallocating existing firm resources (Lucas, 1967). If an awarded firm would otherwise 
choose to finance itself regardless of whether it gains public R&D subsidies or not, we 
expect that the adjustment costs of additional R&D investment may become too high for 
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the company in the short run. In this situation, government support may serve as a 
substitute to the private R&D investment that exerts limited effects on R&D investments 
and firm productivity in the short term. However, if the awarded firm should choose not 
to finance itself, we expect the firm to move quickly with government support and 
observe the effects of the public R&D program within a short period of time. When the 
adjustment costs of R&D investment are considered, we infer that the stronger the 
liquidity constraints faced by firms are, the stronger the observed effects of government 
subsidies are in the short run. Empirically, Lach (2002) and Lööf and Hesmati (2005) 
find that government subsidies are particularly strong in the short run (normally within 
one to three years after the infusion of subsidies) for small firms which are usually 
expected to face high-level liquidity constraints.  
Second, the dynamic effects of public R&D programs may also be related to the 
existence of the certification effects of such programs (Lerner, 2000; Meuleman and De 
Maeseneire, 2008).  Projects backed by government subsidies have precise duration and 
are assessed by administrative agencies once the granting period expires. Failing this 
assessment may send negative signals to potential external financiers; hence, firms may 
have to prove their performance within the duration of the government granting period in 
addition to the concerns related to the adjustment costs. Therefore, we should expect the 
short-run effects of such government R&D programs to be strong, especially when 
external finance is important for firms. Indeed, public R&D programs exert significant 
positive short-term influences (within one to three years after the infusion of public R&D 
subsidies), as per empirical analysis (e.g., Levy and Terleckyj, 1983; Mansfield and 
Switzer, 1984; Lichtenberg, 1984; Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2000; Callejón and 
García-Quevedo, 2005). 
Third, public R&D programs may also exert long-run effects given that R&D 
activities are performed as a learning-by-doing process. Firms accumulate knowledge 
capital over time via this process in R&D activities. Therefore, the infusion of public 
R&D subsidies may have long-term effects on firm performance as a result of the 
increased knowledge capital. Indeed, Klette and Møen (2012) and Bentzen and Smith 
(1999) reveal the positive and significant long-term influence of public R&D programs 
on private R&D in Norway and Denmark, respectively.  
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In the case of the Innofund program in China, we expect to observe significant and 
positive effects in both the short and long runs. However, we expect the short-term 
effects to be stronger than those in the long term. First, SMTEs in the private sector, 
which are the major target of Innofund support, face severe financial constraints due to 
the lack of access to external financial resources. 2  Such situation suggests that 
government R&D subsidies may be important complementary resources for SMTEs to 
investment in R&D activities. Second, information issues in R&D investment are 
significant. In addition, the credit record system is far from well-established in China. 
The certification effects of government R&D programs, which may lead to additional 
sources of external finance for SMTEs, are therefore important. As discussed earlier, the 
typical Innofund granting period is three years. Thus, we expect firms to react to the 
R&D subsidies quickly and to perform within the first three years after they are awarded. 
Third, it is well documented that the R&D expenditure in China is disproportionally 
focused on development rather than research. 3  We therefore expect that the learning 
curve for R&D investment in China is shorter that implies more obvious effects of 
government R&D subsidies in short run comparing to those in developed economies.   
3.2 Funding forms and the effects of government R&D subsidies  
Government R&D programs support private R&D activities through two major 
instruments, namely, tax incentives and direct subsidies. Existing literature mainly 
focuses on effects of tax incentives and finds tax credits have positive effects on R&D 
activities (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000; Bloom et al. 2002). Nonetheless, to our 
knowledge, no study has tested the effects of the different forms of direct R&D subsidies.  
R&D subsidies in different forms may provide varied incentives to awarded firms 
through different mechanisms and thereby influence the effects of such subsidies. By 
nature, R&D investment is associated with profound information issues and a high level 
of uncertainty. Consequently, agency problems with R&D investment can be severe and 
the incentives offered by the government subsidies of different funding forms are 
essential to influence the effects of such subsidies. For instance, appropriation mainly 
                                                     
2 According to Guo et al. (2014), the ratio of bank loan over equity for private enterprises were 0.6% and 0.8% in 2006 
and 2008, respectively. Moreover, Chinese firms generally have considerably higher proportions of short-term debt 
related to their capital structures than firms in other countries do (Li et al., 2009). 
3 See OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (2015).  
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relies on an ex-ante screening mechanism that does not impose hard constraints on a firm 
after funding infusion. Given the adjustment costs and uncertainty of R&D activities, 
risk-averse executives or lazy managers may be reluctant to respond to R&D subsidies in 
appropriation on time (Holmström, 1982; Hart, 1983; Qian and Xu, 1998; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003). As a comparison, interest-free bank loans and equity investment 
rely on both ex-ante and ex-post screening mechanisms. Although awarded firms may 
enjoy preferred or free interest for the bank loans, companies face increased leverage 
ratio and the pressure of defaulting if they are awarded with bank loans. The threat of 
bankruptcy or takeover may harden the budget constraints of firms and thereby force 
managers to work hard at innovating, particularly when the market competition is high 
(Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Aghion et al., 2013).  We therefore expect to observe 
significantly stronger magnified increases in firm productivity for firms that win interest-
free bank loans than for firms that gain appropriation upon obtaining Innofund support.  
3.3 Market conditions and the effects of government R&D subsidies  
The level of marketization and economic development of a region may affect the 
level of financial constraints and the marginal rate of return from private R&D activities 
of firms; as a result, the incentives of firms to invest in R&D activities and the influences 
of government R&D programs are affected.  
In a market-oriented or economically developed region, firms are expected to have 
much access to different external financial resources and to face intensive competition. 
The increased access to external finance may relax financial constraints of firms for 
investment in R&D activities in market-oriented or economically developed regions. 
Meanwhile, competition may increase the incremental profits of firms from innovation; 
therefore, companies are encouraged to invest heavily in R&D activities even without 
government R&D incentives to escape competition (Aghion et al., 2005). With improved 
access to external finance and a high marginal private rate of return from innovation, 
firms in market-oriented or economically developed regions may have strong incentives 
to invest in R&D activities through their own internal financing recourses or by seeking 
other financial resources even with limited government support. Indeed, empirical studies 
discover that the effects of public R&D subsidies across countries exhibit significant 
heterogeneity (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2000; Cincera et al., 2009). Moreover, a 
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few works based on US data demonstrate a crowding-out effect of public R&D programs 
(e.g., Wallsten, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2013), while most studies based on data from non-
US countries find the universally positive effects of such programs despite the variation 
in the degree of complementary influence (e.g., Lach, 2002; Cincera et al., 2009; 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013). The mixed findings may reflect the influences of 
the marketization or economic development level on the effects of government R&D 
programs across-countries.  
China is large and heterogeneous in both institutional aspects and economic 
endowments (Xu, 2011). Innofund has been operating for 16 years since 1999 in almost 
all provinces in this country. Based on the reasoning presented above, we predict that the 
Innofund effects will be weaker in provinces with a higher marketization level or a higher 
level of economic development than in other provinces.  
IV. Data, samples, and total factor productivity (TFP) estimation  
Our data are obtained from two major sources. First, basic information on Innofund-
backed firms is derived from the Innofund program website 
(http://www.innofund.gov.cn).  The website provides the name and address of an 
awarded firm, the nature of the project, the date of granting, the type of support, and the 
performance evaluation result of the project.  Second, firm-level data on financial 
information and other firm-specific characteristics are derived from the “Above-scale 
Industrial Firms Panel 1998-2007” (ASIFP), which is composed of all state-owned 
manufacturing firms and non-stated-owned manufacturing firms with annual sales of at 
least 5 million RMB (US$750,000) in China between the years 1998 and 2007.4  
We initially identify the Innofund-backed firms in ASIFP to obtain financial 
information and other data following the matching strategy by Guo et al. (2016). 5 
                                                     
4 ASIFP does not cover non-SOEs with annual sales below 5 million RMB; therefore, the sample may be biased and 
cause us to miss such micro-sized firms. We compare the data in ASIFP 2004 to those in the Chinese Economic Census 
2004, which cover all firms in China. Enterprises covered by ASIFP account for more than 89% of the total sales of all 
industrial firms in China in 2004 (Based on the first Chinese Economic Census conducted in 2004, the total sales for all 
industrial firms was 218 billion RMB in 2003, whereas that for all ASIFP firms was 196 billion RMB in the same year), 
thereby suggesting that our sample should not introduce systematic biases into our analysis. According to Brandt et al. 
(2012), the coverage of ASIFP is identical to the corresponding information derived from the Chinese Statistical 
Yearbook.  
5 In principal, similar to the matching strategy used by Guo et al. (2016), we apply a three-stage matching strategy for 
the compuerized matching, which is similar to that used by the NBER Patent Data Project. We then further cross check 
the accuracy of the matching with manual matching.  
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Approximately 6,167 projects were backed by Innofund between 1999 and 2007 
(including firms that received funding more than once). After matching, 2,638 firms that 
received at least one Innofund grant between 1999 and 2007 are identified from ASIFP 
dataset for estimation. The sample consists of 18,224 firm-year observations for 
Innofund-backed firms.6 
We then construct a control group of non-Innofund-backed firms. We build the 
control group through several steps to ensure that our findings are not driven by a specific 
matching method. We initially derive firms that were eligible for Innofund but did not 
apply or did not win support in a given year from ASIFP based on the Innofund selection 
criteria, which are officially announced each year as introduced in Section2. After 
identifying the non-Innofund-backed firms, we randomly draw one-to-five matched pairs 
to build the control group of non-Innofund-backed firms while controlling for location 
(provincial level). Finally, 64,474 firm-year observations are obtained for 12,025 eligible 
firms that are unsupported by the Innofund program. 
Productivity is measured on the basis of total factor productivity (TFP); we calculate 
this variable with two different approaches to achieve accuracy and to ensure that 
conclusions are not driven by a specific TFP measure.7 The first measure (TFP_ols) is a 
straightforward OLS residual from a log-linear transformation of the general Cobb–
Douglas production function. However, OLS production function estimates may be 
biased once the unobservable shocks correlate with input levels. The OLS method also 
lacks dynamic consideration. Hence, we follow Olley and Pakes (1996) by employing 
investment as a proxy for the unobservable productivity shocks in the second method.8 
We use this semi-parametric method to control for both the simultaneity caused by 
                                                     
6 The detailed industry and year distribution of the sampled Innofund-backed firms are presented in Table B-1 of online 
appendix.  Overall, 81% of the sampled Innofund-backed firms are in high-tech industries as defined by the NBS. The 
distribution of the awarding year for sampled firms and the full sample of Innofund-backed projects are indicated as 
well, suggesting the representativeness of our sample.  
7 A possible problem of using TFP to measure productivity is that if the innovative firm generates little revenue as a 
result of the introduction of a new product, TFP may become a biased measure for productivity. We therefore check the 
revenues and costs of firms. So far, we find that less than 5% of the firms in our sample report annual revenue of less 
than 1.8 million RMB. Furthermore, less than 3% of firms cannot break even on average (detailed summary is provided 
in Table B-2 of online appendix). Such summary statistics suggest that the aforementioned concern with potential 
biases in TFP calculation is not a major issue for this study.   
 
8 In principal, we follow the approach of Brandt et al. (2012) to define the major variables (e.g.  production input, entry 
and exit, appreciation rate etc.) to calculate the TFP of firms.     
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unobserved productivity and the non-random sample selection induced by the different 
exit probabilities for small and large low-productivity firms. TFP_op1 is the TFP 
calculated via the approach utilized by Olley and Pakes (1996) with time trends 
considered, whereas TFP_op2 is the TFP of the firm without taking into account time 
trends. Detailed discussions on how we compute the TFPs are presented in online 
Appendix A. 
We also control for several firm-specific variables, including age, size, leverage ratio, 
ownership structure, export and the presence of foreign investors. Firm_Age is measured 
by the logarithm form of the firm’s age in a given year. Firm_Size is measured by the 
logarithm form of the total number of employees of the firm. Lvg_rt is the ratio of the 
total liability over the total assets of the firm in a given year. State_Shr is the ratio of 
state ownership over the total equity of a firm in a given year. Trade exposure and foreign 
investment may affect firm productivity; therefore, we add two control variables that 
indicate these two factors. Export_D is a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm 
generates exports in a given year and zero if otherwise. FDI_D is a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the firm has foreign shareholders in a given year and zero otherwise. The 
variables used are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate outliers. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for relevant variables of Innofund-backed 
firms and of those in the control group for the entire time period of 1998 to 2007. On 
average, Innofund-backed firms have higher TFP than non-Innofund-backed ones do; 
moreover, the former firms are larger and have lower leverage ratios than the latter firms. 
The ages of the firms do not differ considerably. Furthermore, we consider the firms that 
are supported by Innofund either through interest-free bank loans or through direct 
appropriation separately. Firms supported by interest-free bank loans generate higher 
productivity than firms backed by appropriation do. Meanwhile, the former firms are 
larger and older on average than the latter firms.9 Finally, firms backed by appropriation 
                                                     
9 Table 1 shows that the maximum sizes (measured by the total number of employees) of both Innofund-backed and 
non-Innofund-backed firms are more than 500 that seem to contradict to the standard criteria of Innofund selection. The 
results are not driven by our matching/merging mistakes while identifying Innofund-backed firms or constructing the 
control group; rather, these outcomes are attributed to the following two reasons. First, a few Innofund-backed firms 
indeed exceeded the requirement of the program during the funding period, that is, the number of employees was larger 
than 500. To ensure estimation accuracy, we match these firms with non-Innofund-backed companies of similar size. 
Second and more importantly, the information presented in Table 1 indicates the firm-year observations across 10 years, 
whereas our matching of the control group is based on the size of the firms at the time of Innofund awarding. Some 
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have more state-shares and lower leverage ratios than firms supported by interest-free 
bank loans do.  
V. Effects of Innofund and the dynamics of these influences 
5.1 Basic findings  
In this section, we discuss whether or not Innofund affects firm productivity in 
general and whether or not the effects change over time after the infusion of R&D 
subsidies. To address these questions, we construct four dummy variables to capture the 
difference before and after the infusion of Innofund and the time period of subsidy 
infusion. Inno_Aft is a dummy variable that equals to one if a firm has already received 
Innofund support in a given year and zero if otherwise.  Bfr_Innofund equals to one for 
the period within six years before a firm received Innofund and zero if otherwise. 
Sht_Innofund equals to one for the period within three years after the firm received 
Innofund and zero if otherwise. Lg_Innofund  equals to one for the period between four 
and eight years after the firm gained Innofund support and zero if otherwise.  
Table 2 presents the results of the fixed-effect panel data regressions on the TFP of 
firms. In Models (1) to (3), we include only Inno_Aft to determine whether or not firm 
productivity improves considerably upon obtaining Innofund support. The result shows 
that InnoAft is significantly and positively associated with firm TFP, as measured with 
the two approaches discussed in the previous section. The results suggest that Innofund-
backed firms generate significantly higher productivity than non-Innofund-backed firms 
and the firms themselves prior to fund infusion do. For example, Models (2) and (3) 
reveal that after winning Innofund grants, the TFP of Innofund-backed firms increased by 
0.08 and 0.06 when measured by the OP method with and without time trends, 
respectively, in comparison with those of non-Innofund-backed firms and with the firms 
themselves before fund infusion. Moreover, the average TFP values measured by the OP 
method with and without time trends are 2.7 and 2.5, respectively, for Innofund-backed 
firms during the year the funding was won; this result indicates that the TFP of Innofund-
backed firms with and without time trends increased by 2.96% and 2.40%, respectively, 
after fund infusion. Brandt et al. (2012) found that the average TFP growth rate is 
                                                                                                                                                              
firms that received Innofund support previously grew into large firms over time; thus, such firms have significantly 
more than 500 employees on average.  
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approximately 8% for the aforementioned scale manufacturing firms between 1998 and 
2007 in China. Thus, our study shows that Innofund contributes to roughly one-third of 
the growth of such rewarded firms. 
Models (4) to (6) of Table 2 present the dynamics of Innofund influences by 
controlling for the ex-ante effects. The results show that Bfr_Innofund is significantly 
and positively associated with the firm TFP measured with the two approaches. The 
results suggest that Innofund-backed firms generate significantly higher productivity than 
non-Innofund-backed firms do before funds were infused; this outcome demonstrates the 
selection effects of Innofund. Meanwhile, both Sht_Innofund and Lg_Innofund are 
significantly and positively associated with firm TFP; this finding indicates both the 
short- and long-run positive effects of Innofund on firm productivity. However, the 
coefficients of Sht_Innofund are significantly larger than those of Lg_Innofund and 
Bfr_Innofund, as indicated in the Lincom test results presented in Panel B. These 
outcomes show that the effects of Innofund on firm productivity within three years after 
fund infusion are stronger than the selection and the long-run influences of such a 
program. For instance, Model (5) suggests that the TFP of Innofund-backed firms is 
approximately 0.3 higher than those of non-Innofund-backed firms within three years of 
gaining subsidies when measured through the OP method with time trend. This finding 
indicates that in the short run, Innofund increases firm TFP by roughly 11%. By contrast, 
the gap between Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-backed firms in terms of TFP drops 
to 0.23 for the time period between four and eight years after obtaining Innofund support 
when measured via the same approach. Table 2 indicates that Innofund has significant 
and positive effects on firm productivity in both short and long run while the short-term 
effects are stronger than long-term effects. 10 
We also find that firm size, leverage ratio, and state ownership are significantly and 
negatively correlated with TFP, which is consistent with the conclusion made by Hsieh 
and Klenow (2009). By contrast, firm age and trade exposure are significantly and 
                                                     
10 To further investigate the dynamics of Innofund effects, we break down the time period further into an annual scale 
and rerun the estimations (we do not show the tables in this paper because of space limitation). The estimations show 
that the effects of Innofund increase for the first three years, that is, from the year of the funds were obtained, and that 
these influences peak in the third year after receiving support. However, these effects start to decline at the beginning 
of the fourth year.  
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positively correlated with TFP. Finally, the presence of foreign investors has no 
significant effect on TFP. 
5.2 Identification strategies  
Although we have identified a significant and positive relationship between 
Innofund and firm TFP, we cannot claim causality because the positive correlation may 
be caused by other factors. We have two major identification concerns. First, our results 
may be caused by selection biases.   As shown in Table 2, the Innofund selection process 
is characterized by a “cherry picking” tendency in that the chosen firms had higher TFP 
than the others even before the government support was infused. Such awarded firms 
may effectively capture market opportunities such as export and foreign investment that 
outperform non-Innofund-backed ones even without government support. Second, the 
positive relationship between Innfound support and firm TFP may be caused by 
unobservable factors which co-exist with Innofund support. In such case, we can hardly 
establish the causal relationship between Innofund grant and firm productivity. We 
address the identification concerns with two approaches, namely, the PSM strategy and 
two-stage Hackman estimations.  
First, we address the selection issues with PSM approach. We employ the PSM 
algorithm to construct a control sample. The propensity score is the probability of the 
treatment assignment, which is conditional on the observed baseline characteristics that 
enable us to design a nonrandomized study and to mitigate the selection issues of a 
randomized trial (Austin, 2011). In our context, we specifically choose PSM approach 
proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) because this matching method eliminates a 
greater proportion of the systematic difference in baseline characteristics between treated 
and untreated subjects than the stratification on propensity score or the covariate 
adjustment using such a score does (Austin et al. 2007).  
We match Innofund-backed firms with non-Innofund-backed ones with multiple 
dimensions for the year prior to Innofund awarding. In the context of our study, the 
propensity score is the predicted probability that a firm will win Innofund support.  
Following Austin et al. (2007), we choose matching variables which are not only related 
to the treatment but also to the outcome of the propensity score matching models in order 
to improve the balance of the matching process.  
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In terms of selecting the variables related to treatment, we mainly refer to the 
publicly announced Innofund selection criteria. As introduced in Section2, innovation 
capabilities are the major consideration in Innofund project selection. We therefore 
include the value of sales from new products, the volume of exports, and the stock of 
patents of firms, which are major indicators of the innovation capabilities of firms, in the 
matching process.11 Some outcome-related variables are also incorporated into the PSM 
model. For instance, we control firm location to capture disparities in regional growth 
rates and levels of development that may be related to firm TFP, following the approach 
employed by Démurger et al. (2002).  We also control the size and leverage ratio of firms 
that may affect TFP as well.  
The matching criteria ensure that Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-backed firms 
are similar in many aspects which may affect the probability of obtaining Innofund 
support and TFP in the future. 12  Specifically, we apply the one-to-five, nearest-neighbor 
PSM to identify non-Innofund-backed firms. We also impose common support 
restrictions during matching.  T-statistics of the balance tests indicate that the two groups 
of firms are similar in relevant aspects after PSM (the results of the balance tests on 
major innovation measurements are presented in Table B-3 of online appendix). 
Moreover, after applying PSM, we compare the means and medians of productivity and 
firm size between Innofund-backed firms and the firms in the control group in the year 
prior to Innofund awarding. With the exception of the rank-sum test conducted on TFP as 
estimated by the OLS approach, both the t-tests on means and the two-tailed Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests on medians indicate the lack of a statistically significant difference 
between the two groups in terms of different TFP measures and firm size (the results of 
the comparisons are presented in Table B-4 of online appendix).  
                                                     
11 R&D stock, human capital, and intangible asset ratio are important measures for innovation capacity. Nonetheless,   
ASIFP does not provide information on R&D stock or human capital. Meanwhile, the data quality for intangible assets 
is poor. However, the database provides data on annual R&D expenditure from 2005 to 2007. As a robustness check, 
we repeat the estimations based on the subsample in which R&D expenditure is controlled during the matching process 
for 2005 to 2007. The results of estimations based on the subsample are consistent with our main results (the results are 
presented in Table B-5 of the online appendix).  Meanwhile, data on intangible assets are lacking for more than 80% 
firms in ASIFP. Hence, we lose a large number of observations if we include this variable in the matching model. We 
do, however, include the ratio of intangible assets over total assets with one year lag as a control variable in the 
estimations for a subsampled group of firms which have information for intangible assets provided. The results for the 
effects of Innofund stay as robust.   
12 Our results are robust after we remove the common support restrictions. 
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We then examine the dynamic effects of Innofund on the basis of this newly 
matched sample. Table 3 suggests that Sht_Innofund is significantly and positively 
associated with TFP when measured with the two approaches according to PSM-based 
analysis. After controlling rigorously for the selection biases, the result indicates that the 
ex-post effects of Innofund are sustained within three years. By contrast, the significance 
of the positive relationship between Lg_Innofund and TFP as measured by OLS and OP 
without time trend disappears after controlling for the selection biases by PSM, thereby 
suggesting that the long-run effects of Innofund are not robust. The results confirm that 
the ex-post effects of Innofund change over time after the fund infusion.  Innofund-
backed firms maintain significantly increased TFP values in comparison with non-
Innofund-backed firms in the short term. However, this significance disappears with the 
expiration of this program after potential ex-ante selection effects are controlled using the 
PSM approach. 
 A significant limitation of the PSM methodology is its inability to capture the 
effects of unobservable variables. Instead of Innofund, some unobservable variables may 
contribute to the magnified productivity of firms. For instance, we cannot measure the 
R&D capability of firms or observe the management capability of executives based on 
existing data although both factors may contribute to firm productivity. In the present 
study, our main concern is to identify firms that won Innofund grants. To address the 
identification concerns of unobservable variables, we conduct two-stage estimation with 
two IVs to identify such firms.   
The first IV we apply is the total number of the firms in the high-tech zones of the 
city in which the Innofund-backed firm is located in each given year (Lnfirmno). Such 
information is obtained from China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 
(1998-2007). High-tech zone is a special type of special economic zones in China in 
which central and local governments seek to stimulate corporate R&D activities. The 
total number of high-tech firms in local high-tech zones signifies the overall development 
of corporate R&D capability and the supply of strong high-tech firms. This measure is an 
effective IV because the probability that local firms will be selected by Innofund 
increases when the province is recognized as a technology-intensive region.  However, 
the counter-argument to this perspective is that the probability of a firm being 
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selected by Innofund decreases in a city with many high-tech firms given the large 
pool of candidates that intensifies competition. Such a case may cancel out the 
positive relationship between the probability of a firm obtaining an Innofund grant 
and the number of high-tech firms in high-tech zones. Nevertheless, this counter-
argument is not significantly relevant in the context of the Innofund program 
because the recommendation and selection procedures are operated at the provincial 
level. Competition does not occur at the city level. Moreover, this city-level variable 
should not be related to firm-specific productivity, which is the dependent variable of this 
study. This IV hence satisfies the two conditions of exogeneity and relevance. 
The second IV is the ratio of total investment in fixed assets made by local 
governments over total GDP at the county level each year (Fixassets). The information 
regarding local government investments in the period of 1998 to 2007 is obtained from 
the city yearbooks. Under the regionally decentralized authoritarian regime in China, 
local governments manage economic activities and allocate resources (Xu, 2011). In 
addition, local governments compete with one another in terms of economic growth and 
gaining resources and support from the central government. Normally, the more 
ambitious the local government is, the more likely the government is to invest in fixed 
assets. Local governments that invest more in fixed assets may be highly likely to support 
the participation of local firms in the Innofund program competition and to exert efforts 
to lobby for these firms to win Innofund grants from upper-level governments. We 
therefore predict that firms located in a county where the local government invests more 
in fixed assets have a higher probability of being selected by Innofund. Nonetheless, the 
county-level investment made by local governments should not be related to the 
unobserved factors that affect the productivity of individual firms.  
Our empirical model consists of a selection and an outcome equation; thus, we 
utilize a heterogeneous treatment model that accounts for the selection of observables and 
unobservables as well as for post-selection heterogeneity to conduct 2SLS (Heckman, et 
al., 2006). The results of 2SLS that have been derived from randomly matched samples 
are reported in Table 4. Panel A presents the outcomes of first-stage estimation, which 
indicate that the number of firms in local high-tech zones and the ratio of total investment 
in fixed assets made by local governments over total GDP at the county level are 
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significantly and positively correlated to the probability that a firm wins a grant from 
Innofund during a given year. These findings suggest that a firm located in a city with 
developed corporate R&D capability and with many high-tech firms has a high 
probability of receiving Innofund grants. A firm is also more likely to gain Innofund 
support if it is located in a county that invests much in fixed assets and whose local 
government is ambitious. The first-stage estimations confirm the relevance of the IVs.  
The outcomes of second-stage estimation are presented in Panel B. Models (1) to (3) 
show that the TFP of firms increases after receiving Innofund grants in comparison with 
that of non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before Innofund support is 
obtained. Moreover, Sargan test results (Sargan, 1958) indicate that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, thus suggesting that the two IVs are exogenous; thus, they are valid IVs. 
The findings stated above empirically imply that winning an Innofund grant positively 
affects firm productivity even after accounting for the endogenous nature of this program. 
In summary, the two identification strategies used help us relax concerns with 
selection biases and missing variables. We confirm that Innofund exerts significant and 
positive effects on firm productivity in China in general. Meanwhile, the effects of 
Innofund are dynamic over time after the fund infusion, and the short-term effects are 
observed significantly stronger than the long-terms ones.  
VI. Funding forms, market conditions, and the effects of Innofund  
6.1 Funding forms and the effects of Innofund  
As discussed in Section 3, we suggest that the subsidies in different forms provide 
varied incentives to firms that influence the effects of Innofund. To identify the effects of 
different forms of support, we construct two dummy variables to divide firms by funding 
forms. Appropriation_Aft equals to one if the firm has been backed by Innofund with 
cash appropriation and zero if otherwise. Loan_Aft equals to one if the firm has been 
supported by Innofund through interest-free bank loans and zero if otherwise.  
Moreover, given our discovery that the effects of Innofund are dynamic over time, 
we wonder whether or not the effect of subsidies in different forms varies in a dynamic 
manner that remains unexplored in existing literature. To examine the dynamic effects of 
subsidies in various forms, we construct a series of variables that capture both the 
funding forms and the time period simultaneously. Loan_Bfr is a dummy variable that 
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equals to one for the period within six years before a firm receives support through 
interest-free bank loans and zero if otherwise.  Loan_Sht is a dummy variable whose 
value is one for the period within three years after the firm obtains interest-free bank 
loans support and is zero otherwise. Loan_Lg is a dummy variable whose value is one for 
the period between four and eight years after the firm gains Innofund through interest-
free bank loans and is zero otherwise. Similarly, Appropriation_Bfr is a dummy variable 
whose value is one for the period within six years before a firm receives appropriation 
support and is zero otherwise. Appropriation_Sht is a dummy variable whose value is 
one for the period within three years after the firm obtained appropriation support and is 
zero otherwise. Appropriation _Lg is a dummy variable whose value is one for the period 
between four and eight years after the firm gained appropriation support and is zero 
otherwise.  
Table 5 presents the regression results of the effects of Innofund in different forms. 
Models (1) to (3) report the general influences of the two different funding forms on firm 
productivity and indicate that Loan_Aft is significantly and positively associated with 
TFP. Thus, firms supported by interest-free bank loans display a productivity that is 
higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms and that of the supported firms themselves 
prior to gaining support. We also observe a positive relationship between 
Appropriation_Aft and TFP as measured by OLS and OP with time trend. Nonetheless, 
no statistically significant relationship is observed between Appropriation_Aft and the 
TFP measured by OP without time trend.  
Meanwhile, the Lincom test results show that the coefficients of Loan_Aft are 
significantly greater than those of Appropriation_Aft, thus suggesting that firms 
supported by interest-free bank loans enjoy greater increases in productivity than those 
supported by appropriation do. For instance, firms supported by interest-free bank loans 
generate a TFP (as measured by OLS) that is approximately 0.11 higher than that of non-
Innofund-backed firms and that of the supported firms prior to receiving Innofund grants. 
However, the gap between firms supported by appropriation and non-Innofund-backed 
firms as well as the firms themselves prior to Innofund infusion is barely 0.07 in terms of 
TFP as measured by OLS. These findings are consistent with our predictions that 
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Innofund support in the form of interest-free bank loans exerts stronger effects on firm 
productivity than the support in the form of appropriation does.  
We examine the dynamic effects of Innofund in different forms as well. Interestingly, 
the selection effects of Innofund in the form of interest-free bank loans on the TFP 
measured by all three methods are significant, as shown in Models (4) to (6) of Table 5. 
By contrast, a statistically significant relationship is not detected between 
Appropriation_Bfr and TFP, with the exception of the TFP measured by OP with time 
trend. These results imply that with increased market discipline, the ex-ante selection 
effects are stronger with interest-free bank loan support than with appropriation support.  
After controlling for ex-ante selection, the effects of interest-free bank loans are 
sustained across both short-run and long-run periods; nonetheless, the effects are stronger 
in the short run than in the long run. In addition, the positive effects of Innofund are 
observed only in the form of appropriation in the short-run period when the TFP is 
measured by OLS and the OP with time trend. No statistically significant relationship is 
detected between Innofund in the form of appropriation in the long run and the TFP 
measured by any method.  
The results in Table 5 support our prediction that different forms of government 
R&D support influence the effects of Innofund. Government subsidies in the form of 
interest-free bank loans exert stronger effects on firms than those receiving support in the 
form of appropriation in China. Our results remain robust for the PSM sample (we do not 
present these results to save space). Such finds are consistent with our predictions that 
government R&D subsidies imposing both ex-ante and ex-post screening systems have 
stronger effects on firm TFP than those relying only on ex-ante project screening do.   
6.2 Market conditions and Innofund effects  
We examine the influences of market conditions on the effects of Innofund with the 
focus on two aspects of regional heterogeneity, namely, economic development and 
marketization level of the regions. First, we divide the regions into two subgroups, 
namely, developed and under-developed regions, on the basis of economic development 
as defined by the State Statistical Bureau. Second, we use the marketization index 
constructed by Fan et al. (2009) to segment the provinces into another two subgroups, 
namely, more market-oriented and less market-oriented regions. The marketization index 
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focuses on five major aspects of market development, namely, the relationship between 
business and government, private sector development, the progression of product markets, 
resource market development, and the progression of business service agencies and legal 
institutions. Market-oriented regions refer to the top six provinces whose total scores are 
the highest. The remaining regions are defined as less market-oriented regions.  
We rerun the estimations shown in Table 2 for the subsamples divided by the 
aforementioned measurements. Table 6 depicts the estimations of the effects of Innofund 
in regions with different degrees of marketization. Models (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) 
indicate the estimations for less and more market-oriented regions, respectively. As per 
Models (1) to (3), all Innofund variables are significantly and positively associated with 
the TFP of firms, thereby suggesting that Innofund-backed firms generate higher 
productivity than non-Innofund-backed firms do in less market-oriented regions both 
before and after the infusion of government funds. By contrast, a statistically significant 
relationship is merely observed between Sht_Innofund and the TFP measured by the OP 
approach with time trend in more market-oriented regions; thus, Innofund has no 
significant effects on firm productivity in such regions. Furthermore, the trends of 
Innofund effects in both subsamples are similar to those observed for the entire sample, 
namely the short-run effects of Innofund (within three years after the infusion of funds) 
are stronger than the selection and long-run effects.  
Table 7 presents the regression results for the effects of Innofund across regions by 
economic development. Models (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) depict the estimation for under-
developed and developed regions, respectively. All Innofund-related variables are 
significantly and positively associated with the TFP of firms across Models (1) to (3) 
(except for the Lg_Innofund measured by OP without time trend; the significance of this 
variable is observed at the margin). This outcome indicates the significant effects of this 
program in under-developed regions; Innofund-backed firms exhibit higher TFP than 
non-Innofund-backed ones do in both short and long runs. Meanwhile, Sht_Innofund is 
significantly and positively correlated to the TFP of firms across Models (4) to (6). This 
observation implies that firms backed by this program generate higher productivity than 
non-Innofund-backed firms do within three years after fund infusion in developed regions. 
By contrast, Lg_Innofund is significantly and positively correlated with only the TFP 
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measured by OP with time trend, as shown in Model (5). This finding suggests that the 
long-run effects of Innofund on the TFP of firms in developed regions are not robust.  
By comparing the coefficients of Innofund variables, we observe that the gap in the 
productivity levels of Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-backed firms is larger in under-
developed regions than that in developed regions regardless of whether or not we focus 
on the selection effects or the short-run or long-run ex-post effects of Innofund. These 
results suggest that with all things equal, the effects of government R&D subsidies are 
stronger in under-developed regions than in developed regions in China. Meanwhile, the 
trends of the Innofund effects in both under-developed and developed regions are similar 
to those observed for the entire sample; that is, the effects are stronger in the short-run 
than in long-run period.  
In summary, Tables 6 and 7 suggest that a firm located in a less market-oriented 
region or an under-developed province is more likely to benefit from the Innofund 
program than a firm situated in a province with a developed economy or market. 
Moreover, Innofund exerts stronger effects on the productivity increase of firms in short 
run than in long run. Our results remain robust for the PSM sample (we do not present 
these results to save space). In general, the findings are consistent with our prediction and 
support the “market failure” hypothesis; that is, Innofund exerts stronger effects in 
regions with less-functional markets.  
VII. Conclusion  
This study examines different factors that may influence the effects of Innofund on 
firm productivity.  Innofund-backed firms generate significantly higher productivity after 
winning the subsidies comparing to non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms prior 
to the infusion of Innofund. Moreover, although Innofund has significantly positive ex-
post effects on firm productivity in both short and long runs, the effects are dynamic. The 
short-term effects are significantly stronger than the long-term ones; such results are 
consistent with the majority of empirical evidence (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2000; 
Lach, 2002; Lööf and Hesmati, 2005). Additionally, Innofund in the form of interest-free 
bank loans exerts stronger effects on firm productivity than Innofund in the form of 
appropriation does. These findings support the predictions derived from agency theory 
(Holmström, 1982; Hart, 1983; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Aghion et al., 2013). 
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Finally, the effects of Innofund are heterogeneous across markets. Such influences are 
stronger in economically under-developed or less market-oriented provinces.  
This research contributes to existing literature in three aspects. First, this study is 
among the few that identify the heterogeneous effects of government subsidies; this work 
also reveals that these effects are dynamic and vary across markets depending on the 
different forms of support. This study also adds to research on government R&D 
programs by providing a new perspective on the evaluation of government R&D policy 
and policy implications. Second, we successfully control for the identification challenges 
of cross-country studies by examining the effects of Innofund across regions, within the 
same country, and under the same R&D program. Third, this research is among the first 
systematic examinations of government corporate R&D programs in China; institutions 
in this country differ substantially from those in developed market economies. Hence, 
this study contributes to existing literature on the interactions between R&D financing 
and institutions.  
Finally, our empirical findings have implications for government policy. The 
findings regarding the dynamic effects of Innofund in the short and long runs, especially 
the weaker influences in the long run, may indicate the limited effects of such programs 
on technology spillover. Meanwhile, the strengthened effect of interest-free bank loans 
over that of appropriation indicates a market-discipline-focused direction toward which 
policymakers can steer the operation of government R&D programs. Finally, the findings 
regarding the stronger effect in less market-oriented or less developed regions suggest 
that policymakers may consider allocating increased resources to support corporate R&D 
activities in such areas to achieve higher returns from government R&D programs.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Innofund-backed Observations and Observations in the Control Group 
Variable 
Innofund-
backed  
Obs 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Non-Innofund-backed  
Obs 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Diff T-statistics 
Firm_Age 17,845 9.98 7.42 0 29.00 63,695 10.11 7.59 0.00 29.00 0.13*** (2.06) 
Firm_Size 17,847 290.21 361.35 0 3,446.00 63,713 154.51 176.49 0.00 3,446.00 −135.71*** (−48.58) 
Lvg_rt 17,799 0.56 0.25 0 13.06 63,388 0.61 0.34 0.00 15.70 0.04*** (18.48) 
State_Shr 17,702 0.10 0.27 0 1.00 62,776 0.12 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.02*** (8.96) 
TFP_ols 16,742 0.36 0.99 −9.89 4.59 59,211 0.03 1.18 −13.42 6.58 −0.33*** (−36.79) 
TFP_op1 16,745 2.70 1.44 −7.49 8.38 59,234 2.43 1.58 −11.99 9.70 −0.27*** (−21.06) 
TFP_op2 16,745 2.42 1.04 −8.21 7.15 59,234 2.22 1.27 −11.01 8.80 −0.20*** (−21.06) 
Variable 
Innofund-
backed  
Obs(Loan) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Innofund-backed  
Obs(Appropriation) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Diff T-statistics 
Firm_Age 8,475 10.68 7.54 0.00 29.00 9,220 9.31 7.22 0 29.00 −1.37*** (−12.31) 
Firm_Size 8,475 357.68 392.58 0.00 3,446.00 9,222 228.36 317.57 0 3,446.00 −129.32*** (−23.97) 
Lvg_rt 8,458 0.58 0.25 0.00 13.06 9,191 0.54 0.25 0 5.32 −0.04*** (−11.53) 
State_Shr 8,424 0.08 0.25 0.00 1.00 9,129 0.12 0.30 0 1.00 0.03*** (8.06) 
TFP_ols 8,045 0.43 0.92 −9.89 4.59 8,557 0.30 1.04 −9.85 4.58 −0.13*** (−8.55) 
TFP_op1 8,045 2.70 1.45 −7.49 8.38 8,560 2.69 1.44 −7.44 7.74 −0.01 (−0.44) 
TFP_op2 8,045 2.38 0.96 −8.21 7.15 8,560 2.45 1.11 −7.65 6.96 0.07*** (4.52) 
* p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01
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Table 2: Dynamic Effects of Innofund on Firm TFP (Randomly Drawn Sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
Panel A  Dynamic Effects of Innofund on Firm TFP 
InnoAft 0.088*** 0.080*** 0.063***    
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020)    
Bfr_Innofund    0.187*** 0.213*** 0.175*** 
 
   (0.068) (0.070) (0.068) 
Sht_Innofund    0.281*** 0.298*** 0.244*** 
 
   (0.071) (0.073) (0.071) 
Lg_Innofund    0.185** 0.225*** 0.162** 
 
   (0.076) (0.079) (0.077) 
Firm_Age 0.163*** 0.187*** 0.081*** 0.161*** 0.186*** 0.080*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
State_Shr -0.118*** -0.145*** -0.135*** -0.115*** -0.142*** -0.132*** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Lvg_rt -0.215*** -0.200*** -0.188*** -0.215*** -0.199*** -0.188*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Firm_Size -0.025 -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.024 -0.053*** -0.054*** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Export_D 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
FDI_D 0.001 0.003 -0.010 0.003 0.004 -0.009 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constants 0.281*** 2.717*** 2.199*** 0.245*** 2.677*** 2.165*** 
 
(0.077) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080) 
Year Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 75472 75497 75497 75472 75497 75497 
adj. R-sq 0.029 0.020 0.042 0.030 0.020 0.043 
Panel B The difference between Long run effects and short run effects  
Sht_Innofund - Bfr_Innofund 
  
0.095*** 
(0.019) 
0.085*** 
(0.020) 
0.069*** 
(0.019) 
Lg_Innofund - Sht_Innofund 
  
-0.096*** 
(0.027) 
-0.073*** 
(0.028) 
-0.082*** 
(0.028) 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
25 
 
Table 3: Dynamic Effects of Innofund on Firm TFP (PSM Sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
Panel A  Dynamic Effects of Innofund on Firm TFP 
InnoAft 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.025    
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)    
Bfr_Innofund    0.125* 0.179** 0.108 
    (0.068) (0.070) (0.068) 
Sht_Innofund    0.202*** 0.257*** 0.143** 
    (0.071) (0.073) (0.071) 
Lg_Innofund    0.094 0.175** 0.025 
 
   (0.076) (0.078) (0.076) 
Firm_Age 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.107*** 0.188*** 0.189*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
State_Shr -0.029 -0.047 -0.052* -0.029 -0.045 -0.053* 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Lvg_rt -0.195*** -0.167*** -0.157*** -0.194*** -0.166*** -0.157*** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Firm_Size -0.048*** -0.084*** -0.095*** -0.048*** -0.084*** -0.094*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Export_D 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
FDI_D -0.018 -0.018 -0.028 -0.017 -0.017 -0.026 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constants 0.480*** 2.963*** 2.394*** 0.457*** 2.931*** 2.374*** 
 
(0.067) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) 
Year Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 81098 81116 81116 81098 81116 81116 
adj. R-sq 0.029 0.019 0.060 0.030 0.019 0.061 
Panel B The difference between Long run effects and short run effects  
Sht_Innofund - Bfr_Innofund 
  
0.077*** 
(0.018) 
0.077*** 
(0.019) 
0.035*** 
(0.019) 
Lg_Innofund - Sht_Innofund 
  
-0.108*** 
(0.026) 
-0.082*** 
(0.028) 
-0.119*** 
(0.028) 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
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Table 4: Two-stage Estimations of Firm TFP  
1st Stage13 InnoAft InnoAft InnoAft 
lnfirmno 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fixassets 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constants -3.01*** -3.01*** -3.01*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
2nd Stage TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
InnoAft 1.302* 2.399*** 1.457*** 
 (0.670) (0.915) (0.423) 
Firm_Age -0.074*** 0.035 -0.065*** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.016) 
State_Shr -1.367*** -1.559*** -1.426*** 
 (0.107) (0.144) (0.080) 
Lvg_rt -0.182 -0.016 -0.234 
 (0.403) (0.543) (0.192) 
Firm_Size -0.053* -0.169*** -0.205*** 
 (0.031) (0.041) (0.023) 
Export_D -0.025 0.060 -0.023 
 (0.030) (0.044) (0.028) 
FDI_D 0.393*** 0.310*** 0.277*** 
 (0.043) (0.060) (0.044) 
Constants 0.877*** 3.322*** 3.402*** 
 (0.134) (0.177) (0.097) 
Year Effect Y Y            Y 
Firm Effect Y Y            Y 
N 38423 38440 38440 
Sargan test P value 0.197 0.308 0.373 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
                                                     
13 All the control variables for the first stage are the same with those of the second stage. We do not present them to 
save the space. 
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Table 5: Effects of Innofund in Different Forms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
Loan_Aft 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.088***    
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)    
Appropriation_Aft 0.071*** 0.059** 0.038    
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)    
Loan_Bfr    0.229** 0.248*** 0.243*** 
    (0.089) (0.087) (0.088) 
Loan_Sht    0.342*** 0.351*** 0.334*** 
    (0.093) (0.091) (0.092) 
Loan_Lg    0.239** 0.287*** 0.264*** 
    (0.099) (0.097) (0.098) 
Appropriation_Bfr    0.153 0.186* 0.120 
    (0.099) (0.104) (0.099) 
Appropriation_Sht    0.229** 0.250** 0.165 
    (0.103) (0.110) (0.104) 
Appropriation_Lg    0.140 0.169 0.073 
    (0.111) (0.117) (0.112) 
Firm_Age 0.164*** 0.188*** 0.083*** 0.163*** 0.188*** 0.082*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
State_Shr -0.119*** -0.146*** -0.136*** -0.116*** -0.143*** -0.134*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Lvg_rt -0.215*** -0.199*** -0.188*** -0.214*** -0.198*** -0.187*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Firm_Size -0.025* -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.025 -0.053*** -0.055*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Export_D 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
FDI_D 0.001 0.004 -0.010 0.003 0.005 -0.009 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constants 0.281*** 2.717*** 2.198*** 0.245*** 2.677*** 2.164*** 
 (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) 
Year Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 75364 75389 75389 75333 75358 75358 
adj. R-sq 0.029 0.020 0.043 0.030 0.020 0.043 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
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Table 6: Effects of Innofund in Regions with Different Degrees of Marketization 
 Less marked-oriented regions More market-oriented regions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
Bfr_Innofund 0.250*** 0.272*** 0.232** 0.099 0.128 0.094 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.094) (0.102) (0.093) 
Sht_Innofund 0.367*** 0.368*** 0.312*** 0.154 0.185* 0.135 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.098) (0.107) (0.097) 
Lg_Innofund 0.254** 0.264** 0.194* 0.081 0.144 0.089 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.111) (0.103) (0.112) (0.103) 
Firm_Age 0.213*** 0.246*** 0.136*** 0.069** 0.083*** -0.016 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) 
State_Shr -0.148*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.020 -0.046 -0.020 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) 
Lvg_rt -0.154*** -0.144*** -0.114*** -0.296*** -0.273*** -0.286*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) 
Firm_Size -0.064*** -0.091*** -0.082*** 0.027 -0.002 -0.014 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Export_D 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
FDI_D 0.018 0.032 0.009 -0.001 -0.007 -0.014 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
Constants 0.278** 2.656*** 2.109*** 0.236** 2.716*** 2.239*** 
 (0.123) (0.126) (0.127) (0.100) (0.103) (0.100) 
Year Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 37318 37324 37324 38154 38173 38173 
adj. R-sq 0.024 0.025 0.056 0.048 0.026 0.035 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
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Table 7: Effects of Innofund in Developed and Under-developed Regions  
 Under-developed regions Developed regions  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
Bfr_Innofund 0.219** 0.238** 0.198** 0.141* 0.177* 0.137 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.084) (0.093) (0.084) 
Sht_Innofund 0.330*** 0.333*** 0.272*** 0.202** 0.235** 0.186** 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.087) (0.096) (0.087) 
Lg_Innofund 0.228** 0.257** 0.179 0.119 0.171* 0.119 
 (0.111) (0.113) (0.112) (0.093) (0.102) (0.094) 
Firm_Age 0.210*** 0.243*** 0.133*** 0.063** 0.076*** -0.023 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) 
State_Shr -0.170*** -0.193*** -0.192*** 0.013 -0.024 0.006 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) 
Lvg_rt -0.185*** -0.171*** -0.145*** -0.263*** -0.246*** -0.258*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) 
Firm_Size -0.043* -0.070*** -0.062** 0.007 -0.023 -0.035* 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Export_D 0.051** 0.052** 0.057** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.074*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
FDI_D 0.056 0.070 0.051 -0.022 -0.028 -0.037 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) 
Constants 0.188 2.556*** 2.013*** 0.336*** 2.840*** 2.358*** 
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.124) (0.096) (0.099) (0.097) 
Year Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 39694 39700 39700 35778 35797 35797 
adj. R-sq 0.024 0.024 0.052 0.049 0.025 0.036 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
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